AI Mobile Application Security Engineer

Reads your app.
Writes the fix.

Nandee tests your iOS and Android builds with SAST, DAST, and SCA, then hands your developers fixes they can merge. Not a PDF.

package com.acme.wallet object ApiClient { val BASE = "https://api.acme.app" val KEY = "pk_live_9f3c2e81a" fun client() = OkHttpClient .Builder() .addInterceptor(auth(KEY)) .certificatePinner(pins()) .build() fun pins() = CertificatePinner .Builder().build() } Hard-coded key. Anyone with the APK has it too. An empty pinner pins nothing. FIX · APICLIENT.KT HIGH - val KEY = "pk_live_9f3c2e81a" + val KEY = Secrets.get("api_key")

The problem

Your last pentest was a 200-page PDF.

You needed six fixes.

At a fifty-person company nobody owns mobile security, so it waits for the quarterly pentest. The report lands, the release train doesn't stop, and the findings age in a shared drive.

How it works

Three steps. One of them is yours.

  1. Connect your app

    Upload an IPA or APK, or connect your repo and CI. Nothing gets added to your app.

  2. Nandee reads it

    SAST on the code, DAST on the running app, SCA on every dependency, including the ones you didn't pick.

  3. You get fixes

    AI Triage drops the false positives and ranks the rest by how exploitable they are. Green Agent writes each fix.

What it does

Four ways of reading.
One list of fixes.

SAST

Reads source and binaries for secrets, weak crypto, and unsafe storage.

DAST

Runs the app and watches what it actually stores and sends.

OSS / SCA

Flags vulnerable open-source packages, down to the transitive ones.

Green Agent · AI remediation

Writes the fix in your code's own style, and explains why it works.

Red Agent · Agentic pentesting

An agent that chains findings together, the way an attacker would.

Coming to Enterprise

What you actually get

One finding. Start to fix.

HighSAST + DASTMASVS-STORAGE-1 · CWE-922Auth/SessionStore.swift:42

Refresh token saved to UserDefaults

UserDefaults is a plain plist. Anyone holding an unencrypted backup or a jailbroken phone can lift the token and stay signed in as your user. Seen at runtime in Library/Preferences/.

Before
41  func save(_ session: Session) {
42    UserDefaults.standard.set(
43      session.refreshToken,
44      forKey: "refresh_token")
45  }

Plain text, backed up with everything else.

Suggested fix
41  func save(_ session: Session) throws {
42    try Keychain.set(
43      session.refreshToken,
44      for: "refresh_token",
45      access: .whenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly)
46  }

Keychain, locked to this device.

Copy the fix Why this matters

Who it's for

Vibe-coded on Monday.
Secured by Monday.

Fintech

Compliance

Findings map to OWASP MASVS, the language your auditor already speaks.

Healthcare

Patient data

Catch PHI leaking into logs, caches, and backups before a HIPAA review does.

Consumer apps

User trust

One leaked token is a headline. Fix it while it's still a pull request.

Pricing

Priced per app. Not per panic.

Compare plans

Team

Your first app, covered properly.

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See what's included

Growth

iOS and Android, every build, in CI.

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See what's included

Enterprise

SSO, expert review, and Red Agent first.

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Talk to us

Every build deserves a second reader.

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